Equality:a moral realistic view by Hartkamp, Steven Frederik
 
 
 University of Groningen
Equality
Hartkamp, Steven Frederik
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1999
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hartkamp, S. F. (1999). Equality: a moral realistic view. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 26-12-2020
Chapter 8
A simple measure of
inequality
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I arrived at a list of properties that a satisfactory
measure reecting the moral badness of inequality should satisfy. They are:
1. A restricted Pigou Dalton transfer principle, meaning that a transfer
from a poor person to a rich person will worsen inequality, under
the assumption that the poor is worse o than all could have been
simultaneously.
2. Symmetry restricted to equalisanda, meaning that changing who gets
which part of the equalisanda, or what comes to the same, take a
permutation of the distribution, will make no dierence for the index
of inequality.
3. Restricted homogeneity, expressing the idea that the index is indepen-
dent of the arbitrary units of measuring the amount of equalisanda
4. Principle of independence of no complaints, adding persons who have
no complaints, who are not worse o than they all could have been,
does not change the index.
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5. Weak independence, meaning that the ordering of inequality based on
the distribution of a subgroup cannot be reversed by the welfare of
others: (~xg; ~x:g) I (I )(~x
0
g; ~x:g) () (~xg; ~y:g) I (I)(~x
0
g; ~y:g),
which can be strengthened to independence if the reference, repre-
senting how well of all could have been, is xed.
Constructions of a satisfactory index or measure I(~x) such that it is
greater if and only if distribution ~x is worse with respect to inequality, so
far discussed, failed. This failure did raise some doubts about the possibility
of a complete ordering of inequality in a distribution problem. The failure
had to be explained and these explanations turned into arguments against a
simple measure representing a complete ordering in distribution problems.
This line of reasoning is blocked if we can determine a simple measure. In
this chapter such a simple measure I(~x) is suggested which is determined
up to a monotone increasing transformation. It is sucient to support the
idea that in distribution problems there is a complete ordering regarding
inequality.
I start the determination of the measure of inequality by discussing the
measure of equalisanda in section 8.2.1. A proper measure of equalisanda is
a prerequisite for a satisfactory measure of inequality. Problems concerning
the measure of equalisanda will infect a measure of inequality. In section
8.2.2, I will determine the form of the measure of inequality. The proper-
ties: independence, the restricted transfer principle and symmetry, and the
invariance to units of a measurent of the equalisandum, lead to a measure
which is additive separable with respect to the amount of equalisandum
allocated to persons. By attending to iso-inequality curves the measure
will be determined further. In section 8.2.3 it will be argued that from this
class of functions characterised in the previous section one can choose one
particular class that has some convenient properties the others lack. It is
the class of functions that are monotone transformations of the Euclidean
distance from a distribution to the ideal reference, restricted to those being
worse o than they could have been in the ideal reference.
Next, I show in section 8.3, how this measure meets the arguments of
Sen and Temkin against simple measures. It is argued that on a closer
examination the dierent judgements on the series that Temkin presents
as evidence against a simple measure, support the idea of a simple meas-
ure. Finally, in section 8.4, I have some remarks on the aggregation of the
measures of inequality concerning the diverse equalisanda.
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8.2 The construction of a simple measure
8.2.1 The measure of equalisanda
One part of a proper measure of inequality concerns the measure of equal-
isanda. A measure of inequality presupposes that the equalisanda can be
ordered and measured. Problems with a measure of the equalisanda will
lead to problems in the ordering regarding inequality. If the ordering with
respect to the equalisanda is not clear then an ordering of inequality will
of course be problematic too.
In chapter 3 the possibility of interpersonal comparability was already
explained. Denying interpersonal comparability was like being a strange
creature, a solipsist.1 By the argument there, comparability of levels of
equalisanda was established. Having a certain amount of distribuenda leads
to a certain amount of equalisandum which can be compared to the amount
of equalisandum another enjoys. But it was not established that dierences
of amounts of equalisanda could be compared between persons. The latter
is of course a desirable property for a measure of inequality.2 But as was
made clear by Ng it is plausible that if interpersonal comparability of levels
is possible then interpersonal comparability of dierences in equalisanda
is possible [Ng, 1984]. Comparability of dierences will follow from level
comparability if some conditions are satised. These are:
1. existence of overlapping individuals, meaning that there are distribu-
tions such that a person is better o regarding the equalisandum with
one distribution than another person is with another distribution, and
there are distributions such that it is the other way around. Further-
more, persons are not equally well o with regard to the equalisandum
in all these distributions.
2. semi-connectedness and continuity, meaning that between any pair of
distributions in which a person is dierently well o with respect to
the equalisandum, there is a continuum of distributions connecting
the indierence curve of one distribution with the other.
The rst condition is satised in contexts in which inequality has some
relevance. If the condition was not satised, some persons would be, what-
ever the distributions, worse o than all other persons. But then there
would be no inequality with respect to these distributions. Because all but
1See chapter 3 p. 101.
2If comparing the equalisanda dierent persons enjoy was not possible the orderings
would be restricted to those of maximising the minima [Sen, 1973, p. 44]. Improving
the second worst-o would not mean an improvement with respect to inequality which
is not always according to our intuitions.











Figure 8.1: Indierence curves for i in Ng's argument
the worst-o would be better o than the reference and the latter would
not be below the ideal reference, there would not be any relevant inequality
with respect to this equalisandum.
The second condition is also seen to be satised in the situations in which
there is some inequality. In case of discrete equalisanda while the second
condition cannot be satised, it is a `have or have not' situation like for
example having or lacking a normal physiological apparatus for vision. In
such cases the amount of the equalisandum one person enjoys can be taken
arbitrarily and level comparability is directly dierence comparability.
Ng's reasoning is as follows, it is illustrated with the help of the gures
8.1 and 8.2. Take for example two overlapping individuals i and j and
distributions ~x; ~x 0; ~y; ~y 0 such that in ~x person i is better o than person j
is in ~y with respect to the equalisandum, xi > yj, and in ~x 0 i is worse o
than j in ~y 0; x0i < y
0




j > yj . This is possi-
ble because of the rst condition, the existence of overlapping individuals.
Because of semi-connectedness and continuity there exists a distribution
~z such that zi = x0i, and a continuity of distributions between xi and x
0
i,
whether or not via zi. Similarly, there exists a continuity of distributions
between y0j and yj whether or not via a distribution ~w such that wj = yj .
Take some ~s such that yi < si < xi than there is distribution ~t because of
semi-connectedness and continuity such that yj < tj < y0j and si = tj. But
because of continuity there is also a distribution ~q such that x0i < qi < si
and also a distribution ~r such that qi = rj < tj. Now because we have
si = tj and si > qi = rj < tj, we can conclude that si   qi = tj   rj which











Figure 8.2: Indierence curves for j in Ng's argument
is interpersonal comparison of dierences of equalisanda. This reasoning
is applicable to all persons, consequently we have level comparability and
comparability of dierences.
Because for all persons one could easily accept that there is one and
the same distribution leading to zero of an equalisandum, namely having
zero of the distribuenda, this implies a complete ordering of an interper-
sonal comparable equalisandum given the equalisandum is intrapersonally
a complete ordering, which can be represented with a ratio scale. In such a
scale the measure of the equalisanda is determined up to multiplication by
a positive real number.3 The units of measuring the amount of equalisanda
can be chosen arbitrarily. This was the reason for homogeneity as one of
the properties a measure of inequality should have. The structure of the
measure of inequality should be invariant to the units chosen.4 So far the
measurement of the equalisandum is discussed, let me turn to the measure
of inequality.
8.2.2 Independence
An index of inequality is of course dependent on the distribution x1; : : : ; xn
or ~x of equalisanda in which xi represents the amount of the equalisandum
allocated to person i = 1; : : : ; n. Such an index can be represented by I(~x).
The ordering regarding inequality is ordinal in which only better or worse
3See also [Roberts, 1977, p. 23].
4It will appear in the next section that the measure of inequality is a homothetic
function
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with respect to inequality counts, so the measure I() will be determined up
to monotone increasing transformations.
In the previous chapters, it was also made clear that what matters
regarding inequality is that some are worse o than all simultaneously could
have been. That some are better o is not important at all. The moral
badness of inequality is dependent on the complaints of those worse o than
they could have been. So the index of inequality is dependent on xref   xi
for those persons i for which xi < xref , xref represents how well o with
respect to the equalisandum all could have been, i.e. the ideal reference. If
xi > xref , more or less xi will have no inuence. So the relevant complaints
of person i can be dened by ci = xref   minfxi; xrefg. The complaints
of those persons having more than in the reference, is zero. The index of
inequality is dependent on complaints, so it can be represented by I(~c).
One of the properties a measure should satisfy is independence. It was
rst restricted to weak independence because whether an increase in the
equalisanda resulted in a decrease of inequality was not independent of how
well o the others were.5 It was argued to be dependent on how well o the
others were, because the reference could be dierent. But once the reference
is xed, one can accept independence. This means that if the complaints
of one group g increase or decrease, then independent of the complaints of
the others who belong to the group :g, the badness of the inequality varies
with the complaints in group g. This will mean that a certain increase in
the complaint of one person in group g can be equivalent to an increase
of the complaint of another person in group g independent how well o
those in :g are. With equivalence is meant here that the inequality is the
same. The index does not change if one interchanges or substitutes the
increase of the complaint of one person with an increase of the complaint of
another one. In other words an increase of a complaint of one person which
can be oset by the decrease of another such that the moral seriousness
remains the same, is independent of how well o others are. How they
should be compared is independent of how well o the persons in :g are.
This property called independence has as a consequence that the index of
inequality is of the separate additive form M (
Pn
i=1 fi(ci)) (M () being a
monotone increasing transformation function).
That this separate additive form is implied can be seen in the following
way. Suppose the index can be dierentiated twice with respect to the com-
plaints; an assumption which is quite acceptable. The rate of substitution
of complaints between two individuals is independent on how well o others
are. More formally:
5See p. 238 chapter 7.
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= 0; i; j 6= k
By a theorem of Leontief it can be shown that I() will be of the separate
additive formKolm[Kolm, 1977, p. 10].6 An example with three individuals
will suce to give the idea of how the result is reached. With three indi-
viduals there will be three equations of the following form arrived at by the














































, else I() would not be dierentiable twice [Apostol2,



































After substituting the results from the second and the third equation in









6This property is also used in the informal proof given by Broome in [Broome, 1991,
p. 83]. There are also some other proofs see for example [Fishburn, 1970].
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Meaning a = 0 resulting in b = 0 and k = 0, because the other factors
cannot be zero, I() is varying with the complaints. The other solution
dI
dc2
= 1 means also that b = 0, and consequently a = 0.
So, we can state that the partial derivatives are functions f 0i of those
components belonging to i only. So the gradient of M (~c) is:





(~ei is a unit vector on axis i)
This means that the index is of the separate additive form. That can
be seen by integration via the path (0; 0; 0); (c1; 0; 0); (c1; c2; 0); (c1; c2; c3)
which is
P3
i=1 fi(ci) in which f
0
i is the derivative of fi.
7
The minimum of the index is reached if the complaints ci are zero for
all. The greater the value of this sum of fi's, the greater the inequality.
Because we are after a representation of an ordinal ordering the index of
inequality will be of the separate additive form M (
Pn
i=1 fi(ci)) in which
M is a monotone increasing transformation function.
So far, we did not use all the properties enumerated above and a nat-
ural question is what can be said more about the index because of these
properties beyond that it is of a separate additive form. Symmetry with
respect to the equalisanda will have as a consequence that the index will
not be dierent if the positions in the tuple ~x describing the distribution
change. The dependence of fi on i, i.e. the position, is not allowed by
symmetry, so 8i; j; c : fi(c) = fj(c) = f(c). Hence, the index will be of the
form: M (
Pn
i=1 f(xref  minfxi; xrefg))
Furthermore, the principle of transfers of Pigou Dalton, will lead to the
restriction that the possible functions f are convex.8 If it was not convex,
a transfer from a relatively well o person below the reference to another
worse o person below the reference, would not lead to a decrease of the
index of inequality. But can we say still more about that function f?
By dierent f 's we have dierent forms of the inequality equivalents, or
iso-inequality curves in the space of distributions Xn. Two distributions on
such a curve, dened by I(~c) = a and a is constant, are equivalent regarding
inequality. The form of this curve can be derived by the gradient because




9 (f 0 is the derivative of f), is
normal to this curve [Apostol2, 1961, p. 265]. The direction of the gradient
7This line integral is independent of the path, because (f 01; : : : ; f
0
n) can be taken as a
continuous gradient eld [Apostol2, 1961, p. 339] and so the index of (x1; x2; x3) is well
dened by this integral.
8A function is convex if all the points of a line between two points belonging to the














f 0(ci)~ei but the direction of the gradient is


















Figure 8.3: Iso-inequality curves expressing almost the maximin measure
is the direction in which a variation of inequality is maximal. Some gures
can be illuminating.
Suppose three persons of which person 3 has more than the reference.
The iso-inequality curves could for example be as in gure 8.3. It shows
an example in which the greatest change in the index of inequality is made
by changing the complaints of the worst-o. Figure 8.4 is an example in
which the greatest change in the inequality is made by an equal change of
the complaints of all. Figure 8.55 shows the case in which the direction
of the greatest change is in the direction of the reference, i.e. a change of
complaints proportional to the complaints persons have.
This class of measures can be characterised more precisely.10 Because
the equalisandum is measured on a ratio scale the structure of the measure
of inequality, the form of the iso-inequality curves, should be invariant to
the units used to measure the equalisandum. Because the inequality is
measured up to a monotone increasing transformation, the direction of the
gradient should be similar on each ray through the reference. They are
not dependent on the length of the line between the distribution and the
reference, but only on the ratios of the complaints, because the length of
the line on a ray has no absolute meaning at all. It could mean a particular
amount of inequality, but also any other amount of inequality. The direction












10The idea of the following explanation is derived from the argument of Hicks in
[Hicks, 1965, p. 336].
































Figure 8.4: Iso-inequality curves expressing almost the total deviation from


















Figure 8.5: Iso-inequality curves expressing the Euclidean distance to the
reference as measure
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of gradient should not be dependent on the monotone transformation and
the particular units used in measuring the equalisandum. In other words
the ratios of the parts of gradient should be independent of the units. This
means for the gradient:


























k() is a value dependent on  but independent of ci. Dierentiating with





This is similar to:




Take  = 1, we have:
f 00(ci):ci = f
0(ci):a
(a is constant with respect to ci) The solution to this is:
f 0(c) = a1c
p + a2
This means for f that it is of the form:11
f(c) = b1c
q + b2:c+ b3
Because of ordinality the constant b1 can be incorporated in the monotone
transformation M () of the index of inequality, we arrive at:
f(c) = cq + d1:c+ d2
Because adding more people which have no complaint does not aect
the inequality, (the principle of independence of no complaints) implies
f(0) = 0, so d2 = 0.
11Strictly spoken, one should add by convention logc + d1:c + d2 if p =  1. This is
however excluded because f should be convex because of the restricted Pigou Dalton
principle. This form violates this condition.
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Once again using the fact that the equalisanda are determined up to a














In which q > 1, because of convexity to f . If q !1 gure 8.3 will result
[Varian, 1992, p. 20 .].
All functions belonging to this class are possible. The question is
whether the form of the iso-inequalities can be determined further, or what
comes to the same, whether f can be determined.
8.2.3 Euclidean distance as basis





q); (q > 1)
An index is determined by a value of q. The question is: can the indeter-
minacy of the iso-inequality curves be resolved? This indeterminacy of the
iso-inequalities was the reason for the gaps in the evaluations, whether a
distribution is more or less unequal than another, discussed in the previ-
ous chapter.12 The indeterminacy can be seen to represent the uncertainty
about how much an increase in complaints of one person can be set o
against a decrease in complaints of another without changing the serious-
ness of the inequality. By determining this form of iso- inequalities the
uncertainty seems to disappear. But this disappearing uncertainty is con-
trary to our experience of uncertainty. It could be argued that a further
specication of the form of the iso-inequalities is not to be expected and
even not desirable, because if it was determined precisely, the index would
not represent the judgements adequately by denying this uncertainty.
Although this reasoning seems rather convincing, it is not valid. Our
experience of uncertainty is not contradicted by a further determination of
the iso-inequalities. It is denied that this indeterminacy and uncertainty
is an inherent feature of inequality. Uncertainty can mean that although,
12See chapter 7 p. 231.
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some distribution is worse than another it is not seen by us to be so, for
example because of lack of knowledge. This can be the case for example
in case we are not sure about the amount of equalisanda someone has.
We can be uncertain about the exact dependency of the equalisandum on
the distribuenda.13 It is also possible that the reference is not determined





varies with xref . It can be concluded that a
further determination of f is not contradicting the possibility of lack of a
clear evaluation in a particular case, uncertainty remains possible.
Is there a way of specifying or singling out one of the indices? Of course
one could choose a value of q and indeed this particular feature is separating
an index from the rest. But this is like using names or dates of birth as
relevant features in moral matters.14 It does not meet the argument of
arbitrariness. If particular values of q can be used as singling out the
index from the rest, then any particular value could be used as such and
indeterminacy remains.
Looking at the gures above it is remarkable that all the indices but
the one with q = 2 have the feature that a change of inequality in the
direction of the gradient, results in a change of the direction of the gradient
of the distribution arrived at. This change of the direction of the gradient is
dependent on the former change in inequality as is illustrated in gure 8.6.
But this dependency will, whatever the way it is constructed, arbitrary. A
problem the index with q = 2 does not suer from, because there is no such
dependency. The direction of the gradient does not change if there is a
change of inequality in the direction of the gradient. The index with q = 2
will not suer from arbitrary dependency of the direction of the gradient
on former changes in the direction of the gradient.
The index with q = 2 is also the only one such that the direction of
the maximal change, i.e. the gradient, at any point is directed to the ideal
reference, a property that is likely to be expected from a measure. This
index is the only one such that the distribution of the total amount of
equalisandum necessary to reach the reference, is following the direction of
the maximal change of inequality. This can be seen as follows.







i=1 ci = 0. Suppose now















13See for example the footnote on p. 205 in chapter 6.
14See chapter 2 p. 24.




















Figure 8.6: Illustration of the change of gradients dependent on former
changes in inequality in the direction of gradients
Because 8i : ci + i(
Pn



















In other words f
0(ci)
ci
= k (k is a constant independent from the complaints
ci). So f 0(ci) = k:ci. Integrating this equality shows f(c) is of the form c2.
If the total amount of equalisanda necessary to reach egalitarian reference
is distributed along the gradient then the reference will not be reached
unless q = 2. If q 6= 2 the reference will not be reached because of wasting
the equalisandum to those already better o than the reference. Only
the function with q = 2 has the property that an improvement along the
gradient at a point will result in reaching the reference.
Because of these properties, a change along the gradient will lead to the
reference, and the change of the direction of the gradient is not dependent
on the change of the inequality, the index with q = 2 can be given priority
to the other indices. So, the index reecting the moral badness of inequality
in a proper way is:
I(~x) = M (
nX
i=1
(xref  minfxref ; xig)
2)
The inequality is worse, the greater the Euclidean distance between the
reference and the distribution restricted to those that are worse o than all
could have been.


































Figure 8.7: Illustration of changes in inequality in the direction of gradients
This index has some resemblance to the variance and the coecient of
variation. There is some relation with the descriptive statistical measures.
It would of course be very surprising if there was no relation at all. After all,
all the measures that are suggested try to capture some aspect of inequality.
Their disadvantage however, was that they lacked the proper connection
with what is morally wrong with inequality. The index presented here
has the advantage that it is not arbitrary, it is based on the meaning of
inequality reecting what is morally wrong with inequality, namely that
some persons are worse o than all could have been simultaneously.
On the other hand because there is such a close connection with the
coecient of variation we should be careful and check whether it does not
suer the drawbacks of the this coecient, in other words whether it holds
against the arguments against the measures discussed in the previous chap-
ters. Because if it could not, there would be a powerful reductio ad absur-
dum argument against the possibility of a simple measure of inequality.
8.3 The arguments for complexity revisited
It could easily be argued that one important reason for the complexity of
inequality has its origin in the assumption that there is one equalisandum.
This assumption is responsible for some problems about determining the
meaning of equality and also about the measure of inequality. If it is as-
sumed that there is one equalisandum it seems that equality is complex
while in fact the problem is located at the attempt to search for `the most
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important equalisandum' in all situations. If there is no ordering with
respect to this equalisandum, there will not be an ordering of inequality
either. But as will be clear, it is not the measure of inequality which is
complex but the ordering regarding this `most important equalisandum'.
Once moral value pluralism is accepted, the problem or the lack of the or-
dering of this `most important equalisandum' can be bypassed and it is no
longer an argument for the complexity of the measure of inequality.
But even if such a plurality is accepted and one turns to one among
several equalisanda, even then there are some arguments against a simple
measure. These were discussed in the previous chapter.15 So it is checked
whether the index presented here, which has some resemblance with the
variance or coecient of variation, does not suer from the disadvantages
of these measures.
Sen mentions against the coecient of variation that it is arbitrary and
the principle of diminishing transfers is violated, furthermore only compar-
isons with the mean count.16 These arguments are not valid against the
measure presented here.
First, although it could already be questioned whether the variance was
based on a comparison with the mean only, for the index presented here it
is certainly not valid.17 There is no comparison with the mean but with
a reference which represents the situation in which all are simultaneously
equally as well o as could be with respect to the equalisandum. Some-
times this could happen to be the mean, but it is not necessarily so. This
argument of Sen is not valid against the index presented here.
Second, Sen argued that the principle of diminishing transfers is viol-
ated by the coecient of variation. Again, this argument is not valid for
the index presented here, because as was argued, the only way in which
an ordinal scale could exhibit this principle of diminishing transfers is by
denying that in the higher regions of the distribution, above the reference,
a transfer has no eect at all.18 More or less inuence cannot be described
in another way than either some inuence or no inuence at all, because
dierences in inequality cannot be compared. This idea is incorporated in
the index by only measuring the gaps between those who are worse o than
they might have been in the reference. Those better o do not count at all.
Third, Sen argues that taking the square of the gap in order to satisfy
the principle of transfers of Pigou Dalton is just arbitrary, why could not
another convex function be taken. But this argument too is answered by
this index. It was shown that taking the square was not arbitrary at all, it
15In section 7.3.2.
16See chapter 7 p. 224.
17See the remark by Kakwani cited in footnote on p. 224 in chapter 7.
18See p. 233 of chapter 7.






Figure 8.8: Temkin's series
was the only one with the property that an improvement along the gradient
at a point would result in reaching the reference. Of course, it could happen
to appear that another index can be singled out, but for the time being
there is no such reason and the most plausible index is the one following
the Euclidean distance. So Sen's arguments can be answered. What about
the ones presented by Temkin?
The arguments presented by Temkin against the coecient of variation
or the variance are similar to those of Sen [Temkin, 1993, p. 123 .], which
have been dealt with in the previous paragraph, but they are embedded in
a more general argument for complexity, namely his claim that there are
several dierent aspects of inequality, which is a thread to the idea of a
simple measure. His argument is mainly based on dierences in evaluations
of a series of situations in which there become more and more people worse
o illustrated in gure 8.8.
There are the following evaluations with regard to inequality if the num-
ber of the poor increases in the series above:
1. better and better
2. worse and worse
3. all equivalent
4. rst worse, then better
It is remarkable that the evaluation: `rst better, then worse', is missing.
The possibility of these dierent judgements is explained by Temkin by
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dierent principles. Now we should check whether the index presented here
can account for these dierent judgements. How is the series to be evaluated
by this index?
In the series, there are two groups, the rich and the poor people, re-
ceiving xrich and xpoor respectively. Further the reference xref is equal
or below what the rich receive.19 Suppose the number of the poor is m.
Further, the reference will generally be dependent on m so, xref = g(m)
while g0(m)  0, (g0(m) is the derivative of g(m)) because if m increases
the reference will decrease or remain constant. An increasing reference is
not plausible. The inequality index will be a monotone increasing transfor-
mation of m(g(m)   xpoor)
2.
The judgement `better and better' means that this index decreases, in
other words, the derivative is negative and remains negative. So let us turn
to the derivative. This is: (g(m)   xpoor)
2 + 2m(g(m)   xpoor)g
0(m) =
(g(m) xpoor )(g(m) xpoor +2mg0(m)). The judgement better and better
means that g(m)   xpoor + 2mg0(m) < 0 for all m which is possible.
The judgement `worse and worse' means g(m)   xpoor + 2mg0(m) > 0
for all m which is also possible.
The judgement that all would be equivalent would be the case if g(m) 
xpoor +2mg0(m) = 0 for all m, this would be the case if g(m) is of the form
m 
1
2   xpoor :m+ k or if g(m) = xpoor .
`First worse, then better' would be the case if there was a change of sign
from positive to negative. If the sign of the second derivative is negative,
this will not be a problem. The sign of the second derivative is negative,
i.e. g0(m) + 2g0(m) + 2mg00(m) < 0 if g00(m) < 0, in other words if g(m) is
concave. g(m) being concave means that the changes in the reference will
be less and less as m, the number of the poor, increases. Hence the judge-
ment of `rst worse, then better' will be possible under quite reasonable
assumptions.20
What about the judgement `rst better, then worse'? Although this
is possible by the index presented here, the function will behave rather
peculiar. This can be seen if the series is extended with the extremes on
both sides, one in which all are equally well o as the rich people and one
in which all are equally well o as the poor people.
Because the extremes show no inequality, the judgement `better and
better'would be `rst worse, then better'. The judgements `worse and worse'
would be `rst worse, then better' at the end. The judgement `all equivalent'
would remain all equivalent, if all could have been not better o than the
19See the discussion on this in chapter 6 p. 204.
20The arguments are similar if the index was determined by q 6= 2 > 1. In the formulas
in the text the 2's can be replaced by q.
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worst-o, or it would be rst worse then equivalent and subsequently better,
as in an on-o situation. The judgement `rst worse, then better' is just
`rst worse, then better'.
The evaluation `rst better, then worse' would be in fact, `rst worse,
then better, then worse again and nally better'. This is a rather peculiar
behaviour of an index of inequality. This strange behaviour is consistent
with the lack of the judgement `rst better, then worse'. The lack of this
judgement can be accounted for by assuming that a proper index gives the
underlying judgement `rst worse, then better'. So, an index of inequality
as presented in this chapter can account for the judgements which Temkin
cites as evidence for complexity. But it does something more, it can account
also for the lack of judgement `rst better, then worse'. In Temkin's account
of the judgements, the missing of the judgement `rst better, then worse'
just happens. Actually the acceptance of an index is more in line with
the judgements on the series than the account of Temkin himself. The
judgements on the series do support the idea that there is a simple measure
instead of the idea that (in)equality is complex.
Summarising, the assumption that there is an index satisfying the prop-
erties an index of inequality should satisfy led to an index which follows the
Euclidean distance of a distribution to the ideal reference. In this it has a
resemblance with the well-known measures as the variance and the coe-
cient of variation. It did not exhibit the drawbacks these suered from. It
could account for the judgements of the series Temkin presented as evidence
for the complexity of inequality, it could even account for the implausibiliy
of a particular judgement, `rst better then worse'. This judgement would
mean that the judgements regarding inequality would vary in a very pecu-
liar way in Temkin's series.
8.4 Specicity and aggregation
Finally, one issue about the index of inequality has to be looked at. In
the introduction of this study, I wondered whether it is possible to accept
the importance of equality as an ideal within a particularistic framework. I
argued that the simple index appeared to be possible because of this frame-
work and not despite of it. The moral universalism, implying that like cases
should a priori be treated similar, or what came to the same, if something
is worthwhile in one situation it is a priori also in another, although the
way and extent in which can dier, blocked a simple measure of inequality.
This idea that increase in one value will mean an increase in the total value,
led to a quasi-ordering.21 Sen argued that the extent to which inequality
21See chapter 1 p.7.
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matters is not independent from the other values and principles [Sen, 1973,
p. 75]. For example, the situation in which there is an equal distribution
of one good or equalisandum which precludes the survival of at least one
person, is not preferable to the situation in which one survives but in which
the distribution of the equalisandum is unequal. It is not preferable even
not from an egalitarian point of view. In this way moral universalism led
to a quasi-ordering instead of an ordering. By accepting moral particular-
ism and moral value pluralism, it becomes possible to analyse the situation
dierently.
By accepting the plurality of equalisanda, equality is not linked to one
equalisandum or one good which was supposed to be an aggregation of sev-
eral goods. It became possible to analyse a situation such that although
a distribution is better regarding inequality with respect to one equalisan-
dum it is not so regarding equality with respect to another equalisandum.
Precisely this possibility blocks specicity of equality with respect to one
equalisandum.
Kolm proved that if inequality exhibited specicity, i.e. separability
with respect to equalisanda, there would be a general index of inequality
I(X) = F (h1(I1(~x1)) + : : :+ hm(Im(~xm))) (in which the superscripts in-
dicate a particular equalisandum), which is separate additive with respect
to the inequality indices each concerning one equalisandum. Now it can be
shown that specicity does not apply.22
If specicity was valid, it would mean, because of the separate addi-
tive form of aggregation, that less inequality with respect to one aspect,
would be better regarding inequality in general, disregarding the amount
of inequality of the other equalisanda. But the example concerning survival
mentioned above, shows it does not. In the situation described above the
value of inequality with respect to the other equalisanda does not count,
because in this case it could be argued that survival should be the proper
equalisandum. Because only one person can survive, equality has nothing
to order. In this respect, the survival of only one person is not worse re-
garding inequality than no survival at all; the reference is no survival at all.
Equality with respect to the distribution of the other equalisanda does not
make it better regarding inequality. The functions hj could not be adjusted
so that the foregoing situation is treated properly by this separate form of
aggregation, namely, that equality with respect to the other equalisanda
has nothing to contribute to the equality.23 An aggregation in this way is
22Because of individualism and specicity this index would be possible [Kolm, 1977].
23The function hj could be adjusted in such a way that the total inequality did not
allow the repellent conclusion, described on p. 235 in chapter 7, such that inequalitywith
respect to one equalisandum no matter how large, could be set o against the inequality
of an equalisandum which became so large because of the numbers it concerned, no
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excluded and because of that, specicity is excluded. Lack of specicity is
of course no surprise.
That an aggregation in a separate additive way of indices of equalisanda
into one index of inequality is not possible, was to be expected. One seri-
ous problematic aspect of the traditional views on equality concerned the
assumption that there is just one equalisandum. This equalisandum was of
course the supervalue or the common comparing value which incorporated
all evaluations. The problems with this supervalue, which is, either not
leading to an ordering of the equalisandum, or is of no help in determining
the content of equality, infected the measure of inequality.24 Because of
these problems with the equalisandum, it seemed that equality was com-
plex. But once multiple equalisanda are allowed, it is possible to formulate
a simple measure of inequality.25 A simple separate additive aggregation
of these idices however is not to be expected. Because moral universalism
is left it is not any longer a priori possible. The only possibility remain-
ing, is that it could happen to be possible. But the argument given by
Sen, although given in order to question the possibility of a simple index of
inequality, shows that such a simple aggregation does not happen to exist.26
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, I argued contrary to Sen's and Temkin's opinion that a
simple measure that represents in a distribution problem a complete order-
ing regarding inequality is possible. Their argument was based mainly on
the lack of a measure which incorporated the most basic ideas of inequality.
The measures they considered were not satisfactory, they did not represent
the moral badness of inequality in a proper way. That led them to the idea
matter how small the dierence is between the better-o and the worse o.
24One set of problems is for example seen in determining freedom in general as the
equalisandum. The budgetset is suggested as an index of freedom. A greater budgetset
means more freedom. However there are problems with this, because of the possibility
of intersection of budgetsets instead of inclusion. See for example gure 3.5 in chap-
ter 3. A problem pointed to by Sen and LeGrand and recently by Vallentyne against
the suggestion by van Parijs [Sen, 1973, p. 67 .] [LeGrand, 1991] [Vallentyne, 1996]
[Van Parijs, 1995].
25See also p.146 chapter 4.
26It is not excluded that one could construct a complete ordering regarding equality
over all situations. One could think of such an ordering as a construction of the orderings
of the situations in the distribution problems whereby the weighings of the values of the
equalisanda take care for the ordering between these problems. It is also not excluded
that such an ordering will be incomplete, but the incompleteness will be due to the
general problem of weighing dierent values and will not be located in the complexity
of the ideal of equality as was assumed by Temkin en Sen. It is however highly dubious
whether such an ordering over all situations makes sense.
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that a simple measure was not possible and proposed some arguments to
explain this idea. In this chapter, I have shown that a measure is possible.
I assumed the existence of a measure and I have shown on the basis of the
properties a measure should have, that it is of a separate additive form of
which the terms are a function of the complaints of those who are worse o
than all could have been regarding the equalisandum. Next, I have shown
that, because the equalisandum can be represented on a ratio scale, the
function with the complaints as arguments was a simple power function.
Of this class, it was possible to point at a particular one to be the index,
because it was the only one such that an improvement in the direction
of the gradient, the direction of maximal change in inequality, was in the
direction of the reference. The index constructed in this chapter is of the
form:
I(~x) = M (
nX
i=1
(xref  minfxref ; xig)
2)
(in which M is a monotone increasing transformation function)
I considered the arguments of Sen and Temkin again, to check whether
this index could handle the arguments they stated for their view that a
simple measure was not possible. It appeared that the index was immune to
the arguments of Sen and could better account for the judgements Temkin
based his view on, than Temkin's own explanation.
Finally, at the end of this chapter it is possible to answer the three
questions posed in the introduction:
1. What is the equalisandum?
There are several equalisanda instead of one, each with a dierent
urgency in a particular problem.
2. Why is equality desirable?
Inequality matters because some are being worse o than all could
have been simultaneously. Denying equality to have any value at all is
only possible by practical solipsists, although not impossible, dicult
to defend.
3. What is the ordering according to the ideal of equality?
The ordering in a distribution problem is one represented by
I(~x) = M (
nX
i=1
(xref  minfxref ; xig)
2)
(in which M is a monotone increasing function)
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These answers became possible in a moral realistic framework which is char-
acterised further by moral particularism, realistic individualism and moral
pluralism, based on the Wittgenstein-Davidson approach on language and
interpretation. This framework was argued to be a fruitful alternative to
the traditional background of moral universalism, volitional individualism
and moral monism for the development of an ideal of equality.
In the next chapter, I will illuminate some consequences of the answers
for current political issues, such as questions concerning health and the
distribution of health care.
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8.6 Appendix 1
In the previous chapter, I argued that decomposability was not acceptable,
because the inequality in a group which is better o than all could have
been, would not add to the inequality. Strictly spoken, additivity is not
consistent with the idea of equality as it is developed in this study. But
just as in case of independence, one could keep the ideal reference xed for
the whole group and admit that indeed inequality in the group of those
better o than the reference, does not count, because there is no relevant
inequality for that group. So, the reference used in the subgroups for the
determination of the inequality within the groups is not above the reference
of the whole group.
But what should the references be in the subgroups? It should not be
such that improving the best-o in such a subgroup would improve the
inequality within the subgroup. The most likely reference is the level of the
best-o in the subgroup. All in that subgroup could be as well o as the
best-o in a subgroup unless the reference of the whole group is lower than
the best-o of the subgroup.
What about the inequality between the groups? This inequality should
be determined with the reference of the whole group, and something which
represents how well o the groups are. That could be the level of how well
o all could have been in that group. Decomposability might be dened
in a way that is consistent with the idea of why inequality is wrong. The
question is whether the measure as it was developed in this chapter is
decomposable. The answer is no, simply because the measure is determined
up to monotone transformations, consequently the addition of values of
inequality has no meaning. The next question would be, is there a monotone
increasing transformation such that index is decomposable?27 But also this
question is to be answered negatively.
Suppose there would be an index which is decomposable. Decompose
the whole group in such a way that all strictly worse o than the reference
are in one group and the others in another. If the index is decomposable
the iso-inequalities in the non-decomposed index should be equal to the
iso-inequalities in the decomposed index. If the index is
I(~x) = M (
nX
i=1
(xref  minfxref ; xig)
2)
27This question is more in line with [Shorrocks, 1984].
8.6. APPENDIX 1 267
If x2 is the maximum of those worse o than xref we have also









The iso-inequalities should be equal of these indices. This means that




M 0g:2:(x2   x1) + 0
M 0g:2:(x2   x3) + 0
(M 0g is the rst derivative with respect to its argument which isPng
i=1(x2   xi)





This will not be true in general. So there is no decomposable index.28
28Taking the mean as representant will not do either.
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